mercredi 2 novembre 2016

How to evaluate a DDoS mitigation solution?

Let me start by this funny story. Marie, a 16 years old school student, was our guest in the office for a week to discover the professional world. We explained to her about our business, networks, internet... but when we started talking about IT security threats, we were hilariously surprised: She confessed about having already launched a DDoS attack on the school website, so her parents can not access her results on that day where grades were available online!!!! 

With almost no entry barriers for launching DDoS attacks nowadays, the industry is witnessing considerable growth in the number and size of attacks. Unprotected connected objects have even driven this growth exponentially with IoT infected botnets being massively used as attack vector. In the last 30 days, KrebsOnSecurity  got 600 Gbps attack, OVH over 1 Tbps attack. The last attack was on Dyn DNS provider whose failure impacted major internet services such as Netflix. Mirai Malware was used to launch this attack, by scanning and infecting more than 500 000 connected cameras, DVRs...

To protect themselves, companies are dedicating a larger percentage of their budgets to security and thus creating a very attractive emerging business for providers from different horizons. We can list vendors who started providing services based on their technologies (Abor, Radware), network operators (Level3, Tata), CDN providers (Limelight, Akamai), Security providers (Incapsula, Cloulfare) and cloud providers (Azure, Rackspace).

Each positioning and implementation has its strengths and weaknesses. In the following I'll share with you some key technical elements to take into consideration when you are evaluating a DDoS mitigation solution. 

I'll start first by a quick description of DDoS attack layers. Indeed, attacks target ressources at different layers, each one of them is critical for service continuity. Volumetric attacks either try to flood internet bandwidth mostly with reflection mechanisms (DNS/NTPCHARGEN..) or overwhelm frontal network equipment, for example by exhausting router CPU with packet fragmentation. In the upper layers, an attacker can target the middleware such as HTTP server by brute force GET requests and slow session techniques, or the application layer directly by well crafted HTTP requests that exhausts the application logic or its database. 




Providers should be able to protect from DDoS attacks on different layers:
  • Protection from volumetric attacks requires a considerable infrastructure capacity in terms of network and scrubbing centers.
    Indeed, scrubbing centers count and geographical distribution is critical to absorption capacity and robustness, as they would mitigate an attack the closest to it's source before forming an avalanche, which is much riskier to handle afterwards. It is the case of a provider lacking presence in some regions like APAC, or having only one scrubbing center in a specific region. With the same concerns, scrubbing centers should be connected to internet through extensive peerings and network capacity.
    On this ground, tiers 1 operators have the best position to deal with the larger attacks (e.g. 1Tbps) thanks to their scale. For example, Level 3 has implemented BGP flowspec on its backbone, thus leveraging its edge capacity (42Tbps) to block some volumetric attacks before even they get into scrubbing centers.
  • Protection from upper layers DDoS attacks is more about the intelligence in the scrubbing centers.  Some providers use proprietary technologies like Radware, Arbor or Fortinet, some mix them for better security, and some simply do not use any to avoid licencing fees and thus be more competitive price-wise. What is the underlying technology capable of? signature based only or enabled with behavioral analysis? Manages SSL traffic? false-positive ratio? Compatible with hybrid (cloud+on premise) implementation?
  • In all cases, mitigation should be powered by threat intelligence capabilities. For example, a botnet can be identified before any attack by its communication profile with C&C servers, and the associated infected IPs are fed to the mitigation technology.

One last thing I want to mention is performance. It's not enough that providers stop a DDoS attack, they shoud guarantee that normal traffic won't suffer from performance issues. Let me illustrate by some examples:
  • A large percentage of your traffic is very local in a region (let's say Middle East) where a provider does not have a scrubbing center. That means your traffic will go to Europe to be scrubbed, and then back to the Middle East, thus adding considerable latency. 
  • Your provider has only one scrubbing center in Europe, and gets critically impacted by attacks on several banking customers of his. In this case, your traffic will be rerouted to the nearest scrubbing center, for example in North Amercia, thus adding considerable latency.
  • Routed mitigation solutions uses BGP to divert your traffic on a /24 subnet from your AS to the AS of your provider who will clean it and send it back to you. First thing to consider is the BGP convergence time because it impacts the global time to mitigate. Convergence time decreases when your provider is very well connected to internet, and can even be instantanous if you are using the same provider for internet connectivity. Second thing to consider is the impact of rerouting all of your /24 subnet when only one host is targeted. Does your provider give you the possibility to reroute only the attacked IP?
  • Your provider is using a scrubbing technology that requires intensive tweaking and humain intervention per attack mitigation. In this case, you can expect a longer time to mitigate.

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